Political Instability Reforms in Melanesia — Addressing a Problem or a Symptom? by Regan, Anthony
ssgm.bellschool.anu.edu.au
In Brief 2017/8
Political Instability Reforms in Melanesia — 
Addressing a Problem or a Symptom?
Anthony Regan
Political instability, in the form of frequent motions of no con-
fidence, has become a major source of concern in the years 
after independence in Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon 
Islands and Vanuatu. Constitutional and statutory reforms to 
reduce the incidence of such motions have been developed in 
PNG (2002) and Solomon Islands (2014), and have been con-
sidered in Vanuatu since early 2016. But are the constitutional 
and legal frameworks supposedly conducive to instability the 
key factor, or is political instability better seen as a symptom 
of deeper problems of social accountability not readily sus-
ceptible to constitutional remedies (Regan 2010)? This In Brief 
focuses on PNG experience to examine whether the reforms 
so far attempted or considered are likely to make positive con-
tributions, or will instead intensify deeper problems of which 
instability is but a symptom.
Political Instability and Reform 
Political instability flowing from frequent motions of no confi-
dence (actual or threatened) in a prime minister or cabinet is 
usually blamed on members of parliament (MPs) ‘jumping from 
party to party’ (Okole 2012). Instability is said to be caused by 
the ease of motions of no confidence, tempting MPs without 
ministerial office to support leaders offering such offices, and 
political parties being too weak to maintain the support of 
MPs. The threat of such motion forces governments to focus 
on maintaining political alliances, contributing to a lack of 
coherent policy, to poor economic management, and to cor-
ruption (see Chan 1988:247; Chand and Duncan 2010:35–36). 
It also hollows out the public sector by politicisation of employ-
ment and contracts, reinforcing patronage networks. 
In response, reforms have involved measures to restrict 
periods within which motions can be entertained; restrict MPs 
from changing allegiances when voting on such motions; and 
provided incentives and penalties to strengthen political parties. 
Governments also seek to discourage motions of no confidence 
by establishing large ‘electoral development funds’ (EDFs) that 
give MPs control of discretionary finance sufficient to distract 
them from seeking ministerial office.
What is the Real Problem?
Political instability is a symptom in that it has been fuelled by 
competition for access to wealth and power through control, 
or becoming part, of the political executive. This competition 
explains why MPs so frequently shift allegiances. The com-
plex interaction of political and economic forces involved here 
began even before PNG reached independence, when few 
indigenous people had access to wealth through commer-
cial activities. When ‘indigenisation of colonial administration 
occurred (in the mid-to-late 1960s), legal and other barriers 
to straddling state positions and private commercial activities 
were lowered’ (MacWilliam 2013:229–30). Political office then 
became attractive as an avenue for wealth accumulation, one 
that a high proportion of MPs have grasped ever since. Wealth 
and power came through control of contracts, EDFs, bribes, 
and the allocation of other public funds. Over time, state con-
trol of access to natural resources and land made rent-seeking 
behaviour a critically important additional means of personal 
enrichment. Control of the political executive became essen-
tial for access to wealth. The incentives to gain office are so 
great that bribery, coercion, forgery (of signatures on motions 
of no confidence) and many other kinds of malpractice have 
become part of the ‘game’.
Making the Real Problem Worse?
Reforms intended to reduce instability have intensified the 
real problem because they greatly strengthen the incum-
bent leaders, freeing them from the pressure of the threat of 
motions of no confidence. Impacts of PNG’s 2002 reforms are 
instructive. They undoubtedly reduced political instability; few 
motions of no confidence have been moved since 2002, and 
none successfully. But this has been at the cost of account-
ability. Power and resources are concentrated in the hands 
of an executive left largely free from political accountability, 
The State, Society & Governance in Melanesia Program (SSGM) in the ANU College of Asia & the Pacific 
is a recognised leading centre for multidisciplinary research on contemporary Melanesia, Timor-Leste 
and the wider Pacific.
We acknowledge the Australian Government’s support for the production of  the In Brief series.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect those of the 





In Brief 2017/8  State, Society & Governance in Melanesia 
and increasingly resisting or seeking control of other forms of 
oversight and law enforcement (for example, the Police Fraud 
squad, an anti-corruption task force or the Ombudsman Com-
mission). Problems of bad governance, corruption and patron-
age networks are intensified.   
Largely denied any opportunity to access ministerial 
office through motions of no confidence, political opposition 
groups seek alternatives. This has involved strenuous efforts 
to influence, and — reportedly — even to fund, the activities of 
accountability mechanisms. One outcome is the politicisation 
of accountability agencies and their functions. This has dramat-
ically increased reliance on, and pressures for, court services. 
Further, the executive distributes much increased EDF funding, 
but limits how it flows to opposition MPs, ensuring that most 
fund recipients become members of the government, which 
serves to severely diminish the size and influence of the Oppo-
sition. The speaker’s position has come under heavy executive 
control. The net effect is reduced accountability and dramat-
ically increased opportunities for accumulation by ministerial 
office-holders and their patronage networks, and significant 
pressures on the constitutional underpinnings of the state.
What about Strengthening Political Parties?
In general, political parties in ‘developed’ countries emerged 
by representing, and mobilising political support from, interest 
groups (ethnic, regional, class, economic, religious and so on). 
By contrast, in the periods since independence of these three 
Melanesian states, many mainly small political parties have 
emerged that mostly represent the interests of politicians — 
they are little more than loose alliances, useful for mobilising 
electoral funds and gathering members in post-election strug-
gles for the control of government. 
Assumptions are widely made that the state political 
institutions established under the independence constitutions 
— institutions largely based on ‘developed’ country models — 
require strong political parties to operate effectively. PNG 
and Solomon Islands reforms directed towards strengthening 
parties assume that despite parties not having a basis in 
representation of interests, they can be strengthened by 
constitutional and/or legal measures providing them with 
resources, protection and incentives. This form of ‘reverse-
engineering’ is expected to reduce numbers, and increase the 
strength, of political parties. It is unlikely to succeed as there 
is limited supporting evidence from other parts of the world.
In PNG following reforms, no reduction in numbers of 
parties has occurred, nor have ideology, principles and poli-
cy platforms emerged as bases for mobilising voter support. 
Rather, numerous small parties continue to be the rule, still the 
vehicles for the same political and economic forces discussed 
above. MPs, or groups of candidates, use parties primarily to 
seek access to public office, for narrow constituency interests, 
and to facilitate the accumulation of wealth. 
Conclusions
If legal frameworks are not the central problem that drives 
political instability, as is so often asserted, but instead intense 
competition for access to wealth, then measures intended to 
reduce political instability through legal reform may only inten-
sify these pressures. Both governments and donors should 
reconsider their support for such measures. Indeed, there 
may be good reason to reverse heavy restrictions on motions 
of no confidence, as increased availability of such motions 
may have advantages both as a means of accountability and a 
‘safety valve’, relieving the pressures flowing from competition 
for ministerial office. At the very least, much more effort needs 
to be made to strengthen the capacity (and independence) of 
accountability mechanisms, such as ombudsman institutions, 
auditor-general offices, financial intelligence units and so on.
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